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In the waves of European Union enlargement over the last three decades, most of the 
accession states have experienced a transition from authoritarian to parliamentary-
democratic rule. Indeed, from 2007, a majority of EU member states are ‘new 
democracies’, having begun their transition from authoritarian rule in the 1970’s or 
later. This chapter examines the various modes of transition experienced by these 
new EU member states, but focuses especially on the case of East Germany.
The 1989-90 regime change in East Germany is one of the best known of 
democratic transitions, by virtue of two media-spectacular events – the exodus of 
East German citizens through Hungary and the storming of the Berlin Wall – as 
well as its symbolic significance as the keystone of the Soviet imperium.1 Because 
democratic change was imbricated within the process of German unification, of 
which the leading architects were external, the East German experience has a sui 
generis quality, and appears better suited to historical analysis than to comparative 
study by political scientists.
Yet there are aspects of East Germany’s democratization process, notably 
the mechanisms by which the old regime relinquished power and acquiesced to 
democratic reform, that have proved amenable to comparative approaches. In the 
early scholarly analyses of the transition in East Central Europe, attention was drawn 
to features that were shared throughout the region. It was not just that outcomes 
(marketization, democratization), were similar, but certain aspects of the transition 
process too. In each case, some form of negotiation occurred. Each was characterized 
by the rapid disintegration of existing political institutions, by the ‘aggravation of 
economic dislocations’, by the proliferation of political movements that broke into 
the political arena, and by the establishment of transitory power arrangements in 
which opposition forces acquired varying degrees of access to the official political 
process (Ekiert 1991: 287).
1  This chapter draws in part upon my ‘”A Very Orderly Retreat”: Democratic Transition 
in East Germany, 1989–90’, Debatte. Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 
14 (1) 2006.
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Equally, the differences in modes of transition could not be overlooked. In 
distinguishing amongst these, analysts could draw upon a large body of literature. 
Portugal and Spain, among the first transitions of the so-called ‘third wave’, were 
commonly taken as representative of two distinct routes to democratization. The 
former exemplifies transition by ‘rupture’, in which an inflexible old guard fails to 
compromise when confronted by mass social movements, allowing hitherto marginal 
parties or middle-ranking officers and functionaries to replace or revolutionize 
existing institutions. Such transitions are rapid and forceful, involve extensive 
popular mobilization, and may lead to challenges to property relations. In the case of 
Portugal, ‘the working class took the world by surprise by leading the most massive 
seizures of property in Europe since the Russian Revolution. Workers occupied more 
than 23 percent of the nation’s farmland in less than twelve months and took control 
of more than 940 industrial enterprises’ (Bermeo 1997: 308). Large sections of 
Portuguese society experienced a democratic ferment. Empty houses were occupied; 
cultural centres were established. Some events took on a carnivalesque quality, as 
when a golf course was occupied and opened to all – except its existing members. 
The old authoritarian élite lost control of the political process, usurped by radical 
governments which, for over a year, set about replacing or transforming existing 
institutions. Independence was granted to the colonies, and the vertical command 
structure of the armed forces was radically transformed. The middle-ranking officers 
who toppled the dictatorship, writes Nancy Bermeo (1997: 308), ‘engineered the 
most extensive purges of any democratic state in the third wave, including those of 
eastern Europe.’
The contrasting course, exemplified by Spain in the late 1970s, is driven primarily 
by élites associated with the old dictatorship who accede to democratic transition 
because they believe it will provide them with a new formula for legitimating their 
rule. In reference to the pivotal role played by negotiations between regime and 
opposition, the model is commonly known as transition through transaction. In the 
Spanish case, a ‘class compromise’ was hammered out, in which parliamentary 
democracy and other concessions – including trade union representation in 
companies, expanded parliamentary control over the social security system, tax 
reform, increased public investment and a statute for nationalized industries – were 
offered to the left parties and trade unions in exchange for a commitment on their 
part to abandon their opposition to the monarchy and to the privileges of church 
and army, to advocate wage restraint, acquiesce to austerity measures and renounce 
claims for the return of funds sequestered by General Franco’s regime (Maravall 
and Santamaria 1986; Bermeo 1997: 310). Although most of the concessions to the 
left listed above were not implemented, the pact, signed at the Moncloa presidential 
palace, served to reassure élites that democratic transition would not signal an attack 
on entrenched power and privilege. High levels of political violence and of strike 
activity notwithstanding, the Spanish working class never challenged property 
relations as their counterparts in Portugal had done, and neither was there major 
disruption to personnel continuity at the top of the state apparatus. Core sections 
of the old regime were integrated into the new order, with Francoist strongholds 
remaining in business and banking, the judiciary, the media, public administration, 
and the army. Symbolic continuity was assured by the persistence of the monarchy, 
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albeit shorn of its more imperious powers. For mainstream transitology, 1970s Spain 
serves as a benchmark: it is a paradigm case of a transition in which 
a compromise among class interests [is] forged to reassure the bourgeoisie that its property 
rights will not be jeopardized for the foreseeable future, and to satisfy workers … that 
their demands for compensation and social justice will eventually be met. (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter 1986: 46)
Alongside the two paths represented by the Iberian nations, others may be added. 
For the purposes of this article, the most pertinent is ‘transition through extrication’, 
introduced by Scott Mainwaring and developed by his Notre Dame colleague, J. 
Samuel Valenzuela. As with transitions by collapse (such as Greece in 1974 and 
Czechoslovakia and Romania in 1989), extrication involves a sharp break with the 
formal rules of the authoritarian regime. But, as with transitions by transaction, the 
authoritarian regime is strong enough to dictate important terms of the process, and 
the outgoing rulers ‘hold on to power for a significant length of time beyond the 
onset of the crisis that sets in motion the process of transition’ (Mainwaring 1992). 
In brief, this third category of transition describes those – such as Peru in 1980 and 
Uruguay in 1985 – in which the rules of the old regime are abandoned but the rulers 
retain sufficient strength to negotiate their retreat from power (Valenzuela 1992: 74). 
Valenzuela includes East Germany in this category, but does so in passing, without 
providing supporting evidence.
As regards modes of transition in Eastern Europe 1989-91, a number of studies 
have drawn attention to the distinction between Poland and Hungary, on the one 
hand, characterized by negotiated pacts between party-state and opposition, and 
East Germany and Czechoslovakia, on the other, where mass movements forced 
significant political concessions within a short time frame. In 1991, Judy Batt, of 
Birmingham University, penned an influential article that sought to explain the 
differences between the two paths of Eastern European transition. She discusses 
Poland and Hungary under the rubric ‘failed reform’. In both, hopes in economic 
reform in the 1970’s faded in the following decade as economic difficulties mounted; 
élites began to lose faith in the communist project, and their ability to repress or co-opt 
opposition diminished. The Polish Government’s defeat in a referendum on economic 
policy toward the end of 1987, together with a resurgence of industrial action, led to 
the convocation of Round Table negotiations which were successfully concluded in 
early 1989. In Hungary, also in 1987, the need for an ‘anti-crisis pact’ had become 
apparent to leading figures in regime and opposition élites, a development that 
gave rise to negotiated democratization in 1989. Élites in the latter two countries, 
by contrast, resisted reform. The Czechoslovak and East German economies were 
highly centralized, autarkic, and relatively stable; the nomenklatura2 was, in each 
case, unified and disciplined; and the security forces were used extensively to keep 
oppositional forces at bay. These were regimes which ‘totally rejected reform, because 
they saw it as incompatible with communist power’; they therefore ‘faced total and 
rapid collapse when confronted with the challenge of Gorbachev’s perestroika’ (Batt 
1991: 368). In Prague and East Berlin, ‘the intransigent ruling élite was unprepared for 
2  ‘Nomenklatura’ refers to the lists of senior positions in Party, state and economy.
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negotiation, and collapsed in the face of spontaneous mobilization of the population’ 
(Batt 1991: 369). In sum, democratization occurred not through negotiated transition 
but ‘regime collapse and velvet revolution’ (Batt 1991: 384). In East Germany, the 
government was forced to concede elections, allowing West German political parties 
to move in and assume command.
In subsequent years, these models were frequently applied in comparative analyses 
of the East European transitions. Klaus von Beyme, for example, differentiated 
between ‘negotiated revolution’ in Hungary and Poland, the ‘implosion of the 
Communist regime’ in Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and the cases of Romania 
and Bulgaria, in which transition was controlled by second-rank cadres of the old 
regime (not unlike the ‘extrication’ model of the Notre Dame school) (Von Beyme 
1996). Of greater relevance to this essay, due to the detailed attention paid to the East 
German case, was a comparative study by the US political scientist Daniel Friedheim. 
As with Batt, Friedheim contrasts pacted transition in Poland and Hungary (as well 
as Spain), with regime collapse in East Germany, Czechoslovakia (and Portugal). 
Whereas Batt’s piece is discursive, with extensive discussion of background 
conditions, Friedheim proceeds by isolating two variables: regime divisions and the 
organization of political society. In line with a growing body of literature that criticizes 
mainstream transitology for its overemphasis on the degree of control that outgoing 
rulers exert over the transition process, with popular organization left as a residual 
category, he includes the latter as a core variable, and concludes that the experience 
of the 1989 revolutions reveals a need to ‘bring society back into democratic transition 
theory’ (Friedheim 1993: 512).
Friedheim’s hypothesis is that a transition is likely to be pacted ‘when the 
authoritarian regime is split over initiating radical reform and an opposition has had 
time to organize itself’ (Friedheim 1993: 489).3 Otherwise, where the old regime 
remains unified and political organizations in civil society exhibit little autonomy, 
transition will likely ‘occur through regime collapse and the mass mobilization that 
then becomes possible’ (Friedheim 1993: 489). Friedheim demonstrates that the higher 
the ranking on each variable (disunity of regime and organization of opposition), the 
greater is the chance of negotiated transition as against regime collapse. Thus, in the 
case of Spain, he highlights the regime divisions following Franco’s death, and the 
existence of oppositional organizations in an illegal but tolerated grey zone, from 
which political parties could rapidly emerge, presenting premier Adolfo Suárez 
with well-organized negotiating partners. In Portugal, by contrast, opposition 
organizations before 1974 were stifled by legal restrictions and a formidable secret 
police; the regime, meanwhile, remained comparatively unified. The result was a 
‘collapsed transition’, via a series of interim revolutionary governments.
If there exists one clear-cut example ‘of how weak opposition and a unified, 
hardline regime can generate a transition through collapse’, Friedheim suggests, 
it is East Germany in 1989 (Friedheim 1993: 511). Up until October of that year, 
opposition was weak, and Erich Honecker’s Socialist Unity Party (SED) regime 
  A pact is defined as a mutual understanding between regime and opposition élites about 
how to reach free elections, on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital interests’ of those 
entering into it. It may take the form of a round table, secret consultations, or both.
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remained united. ‘In this context, instead of negotiating a transition, the regime 
quickly collapsed, surrendering control of the streets, and even its Stasi archives, to 
peaceful demonstrators.’ (Friedheim 1993: 511). In the process the regime did attempt 
to swerve onto a track of transition by extrication, by means of a pact prepared at 
round table talks, but this failed, largely due to the lack of organization of opposition 
forces (Friedheim 1993: 493-4). Being sponsored by a disintegrating regime, the East 
German round tables were not instances of genuine pact formation, for they merely 
coordinated the final details of regime implosion. Unable to locate credible negotiating 
partners, the GDR regime ‘withered away’, and surrendered power to the opposition. 
Rather than endeavouring ‘to implement radical reform’ or to ‘defend itself by all 
available means’, it simply collapsed (Friedheim 1993: 494).
The portrayal of the East Berlin regime as having ‘quickly collapsed, surrendering 
control of the streets’ (Friedheim 1993: 494), concords with that of many other political 
scientists, including Judy Batt, with her assessment that the ‘ruling élite collapsed in 
the face of spontaneous mobilization’, and her assigning of East Germany to the 
category ‘regime collapse and velvet revolution’. It has also received support from 
historians, notably Mary Fulbrook. In her pioneering Anatomy of a Dictatorship, 
Fulbrook argues forcefully that the functionary class as a whole experienced a ‘loss of 
the will to power’ in the weeks that followed the storming of the Berlin Wall (Fulbrook 
1995: 62). Up until that date (November 9), she contends, the SED was engaged in a 
‘desperate attempt to cling on to power’, but thereafter, functionaries ‘lost the will to 
rule’ (Fulbrook 1995: 259). The picture she paints of the SED post-Wall fall is one of 
‘disarray … Functionaries were resigning their positions, members leaving the party 
en masse, no decisions could be reached or carried out.’ The end of SED domination, 
she concludes, ‘was marked by the loss of its functionaries’ will to rule’ (Fulbrook 
1995: 262-3).
In this survey, the main points of which are summarized in Table 11.1, a number of 
elements are uncontentious. Communism did collapse in East Germany, more rapidly 
than in Hungary or Poland, under greater immediate pressure from mass movements, 
and with a lesser role for the organized opposition. Some questions, however, deserve 
further scrutiny. To what extent was the SED a unified monolith before 10 November 
1989? Did the regime spurn radical reform altogether? How adamant was its rejection 
of negotiation? In what sense did functionaries lose the will to rule? And in what ways 
was power ‘surrendered to the streets’? In the following I present a brief history of 
the East German revolution, beginning with a brief discussion of Soviet economic 
decline before addressing the five issues on which the above questions turn: regime 
unity; the organization of political society; loss of the will to rule; initiation of radical 
reform; and the extent of negotiation. The article will find that (i) the appearance of 
regime unity masked major underlying divisions and declining morale; (ii) many old-
regime functionaries were able to adapt to changing circumstances and to learn from 
experiences elsewhere in Eastern Europe; (iii) radical reform, and pact making, were 
taken further in East Germany than is generally acknowledged, and (iv) the loss of 
the ‘will to power’ was largely an illusion. These findings raise theoretical questions 
concerning democratization in Central and Eastern Europe that will be broached in 
the final sections.
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Table 12.1 Models of Transition
Rupture / Collapse /
‘Velvet Revolution’
Negotiated Transition
Exemplified by GDR, Czechoslovakia Hungary, Poland
Reforms in 1980s None Failed
Regime unity (1989) High Low (or falling)
Political élite’s commitment 
to Communism
Strong Weak (or falling)
Opposition (late 1980s) Repressed Tolerated
Radical reform instigated by Popular movements Regime reformers
Transition speed Rapid Gradual
Functionaries’ psychology 
during transition
Initially inflexible; then 
‘loss of will to rule’
Adapt and change
Political power Surrendered to ‘the streets’ / 
opposition
Shared with opposition
Soviet Economic Decline: In the Shadow of the European Union
The transformation of Eastern Europe in 1989 took citizens of the region and Western 
analysts alike by surprise. In the case of East Germany, no major public protests had 
occurred since 1953; the state seemed omnipotent. Yet something had changed. In the 
1960s, SED leaders had exuded confidence. Walter Ulbricht even felt able to predict 
that the GDR would overtake its Western rivals ‘on the economic front’. From the 
mid-1970s, however, signs of deteriorating confidence proliferated. Providing the 
backdrop to this sea change was Soviet-bloc economic decline.
The causes of the long-term decay in Soviet-bloc competitiveness are complex, 
but if one stands out it is that the internationalization of the world economy in the 
post-war period that put the region at a serious disadvantage. Its economies were 
relatively ‘trade averse’, with international trade mediated through export and import 
licenses and administered by cumbersome foreign trade organizations. Their limited 
position on world markets was expressed in non-convertible currencies, impeding 
multilateral trade. Trade aversion was exacerbated by the West, which treated the 
Soviet states as ‘least favoured nations’. Comparative autarky constrained economic 
development, slowing technology transfer and emulation.
In this respect, West European economic integration posed an intriguing challenge 
to policymakers in Europe’s other half. On one hand, its political motivation was 
avowedly anti-Soviet. Washington supported European integration as a means of 
buttressing post-war reconstruction, rehabilitating the FRG, and binding it and the rest 
of Western Europe economically into the American-dominated international monetary 
and trading sphere. It was a keystone in the formation of a common Western front 
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against the Soviet Bloc. On the other hand, West European integration provided a 
model of how international cooperation can boost economic growth and forge regional 
political cohesion. Soviet-bloc policymakers were alive to this aspect, and took steps 
to follow suit.
Founded in 1949 as an echo of the European Recovery Programme, the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) lay dormant for its first decade, during 
which time post-war reconstruction in the Soviet realm proceeded along autarkic 
lines. But in the late 1950s it was awakened by Khrushchev, apparently motivated 
by a concern to counter centrifugal tendencies within Eastern Europe as well as 
to stimulate economic efficiency. Integration, it was argued, would enable greater 
specialization in research and production, facilitating large-scale series production 
that would enhance competitiveness. Khrushchev‘s plans were welcomed by his 
counterparts in Eastern Europe, notably in East Germany. From the early 1960s, 
repeated attempts were made to foster ‘socialist internationalization’, with Comecon 
acting as a framework for the coordination of research and division of labour amongst 
participating states.
Significant movement towards integration was charted in this period. Two 
Comecon banks were established, in 1963 and 1970, to handle settlements in 
transferable roubles and to provide loans for intra-Comecon projects. Dozens of 
joint ventures between Comecon firms were established. A ‘Soviet-world car,’ the 
Lada, was manufactured, with components produced throughout the area. Perhaps 
the most notable achievement was the ‘unified system of electronic computing’, that 
strove to deepen cooperation in the field of data processing. Beginning in the late 
1960s, over 20,000 scientists and engineers and around 300,000 employees in some 
seventy firms across seven countries were involved. Nothing equal to this happened 
elsewhere in the world until five or ten years later; Olaf Klenke (2001: 72) flags it as 
the ‘world’s first multinational electronics project’.
Comecon integration, however, was from its inception beset by strife. Despite 
some progress in the 1960s, most plans thereafter scarcely got off the drawing board. 
The standard explanation for the lack of success centres on the fact that, because 
enterprises were bound so tightly into state planning apparatuses, cooperation was 
invariably beset by national egotism. Even the development of a division of labour, 
as Marie Lavigne points out (1991: 95), could be seen as a threat to ‘economic’ 
as well as ‘national’ security: it ‘is a risky undertaking as it may lead countries to 
forsake vital elements of their industrial base, leaving these to partners who may then 
not be able to meet their obligations.’ While similar egotisms afflict international 
cooperation in Western Europe too, in the EU far more power is devolved either to 
the firm or upwards to the supranational level, both of which are at one remove from 
the nation state.
Conflict between Comecon members over the distribution of costs and benefits 
was endemic. In joint projects the tendency was for each side to attempt to impose 
the major risks upon the partner, and for each to seek to maximize inward technology 
transfer and minimize the reverse flow. East Germany, for instance, tended to find 
itself delivering high tech goods to the USSR but was largely excluded from forms 
of cooperation in which technology transfer flowed the other way. For their part, 
GDR policymakers behaved in similar fashion. They resisted, to give one example, 
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plans for the importation of computer chips from Czechoslovakia. Although the 
ostensible reason was Czechoslovakia’s technological backwardness, one suspects 
that an additional motive was the Germans’ jealous (or ‘entrepreneurial’) attempt to 
build and maintain a monopoly position within Comecon.
For many analysts, a good example being Harriet Friedmann (1998: 216), 
Comecon integration should therefore be conceived as having ‘foundered upon 
the contradictory requirements of bloc unity and national autarky.’ For Friedmann, 
Comecon integration and national autarky represented two competing growth 
strategies. The former succumbed to ‘national opposition’ – notably that of Romania 
in the early 1960s – ‘which found its material basis in the [ … ] Stalinist program 
of industry and autarky.’ Although this explanation is not without substance, it fails 
to capture certain nuances. The claim that Romania’s opposition to integration was 
driven by a ‘pull to autarky’ does not reveal the full story. This was the accusation 
levelled against it by officials of the four states that were most committed to 
integration: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. Yet, in reality, 
Romania was steering away from autarky in the 1960s and 1970s at least as fast 
as were the other four economies. The critical difference was that its tendency, to 
a substantially greater extent than theirs, was towards closer trade relations with 
the West. From being one of the most Comecon-oriented economies in the early 
1950s, Romania rapidly became the pioneer of integration with the world market. 
In 1972 it joined the IMF, and by 1980 its trade with other Comecon countries was, 
proportionally, considerably lower than that of any other member state.
Romania’s behaviour was later to be replicated by its allies, all of which began to 
prioritize dealings with the ‘non-socialist abroad’ over those with Comecon partners. 
Increasingly the aim was to gain advantageous positions within Comecon’s geo-
economic enclave in order to boost exports to the world market. Soviet-bloc firms 
sought to import as much as possible from within the area, and maximize exports to 
‘hard’ markets. Trade links and other ties to Western economies tended to encourage 
the flouting of Comecon agreements and amplified intra-Comecon rivalries. The 
basis for Comecon integration was steadily undermined as competition for Western 
markets, loans, and investment infiltrated the supposedly cooperative relations 
between Soviet-type economies. Each jostled for position over trade and good 
relations with the ‘non-socialist abroad,’ as manifested for example in the bilateral 
trade deals struck between the European Community and Hungary, Poland and the 
USSR.
At bottom, the contradiction that most hindered Comecon integration was not 
that between autarky and integration, but between integration with the East and with 
the world market. Romania was not simply driven by a ‘pull to autarky’; if anything 
its behaviour gave a foretaste of the ‘pull to the West’ that was later to dominate 
Soviet economies’ external relations. Underlying its reluctance to join hands with 
its allies was an additional factor: relative backwardness. Comecon integration, 
Romanian officials argued, was championed by its industrialized members for 
their own purposes. They had everything to gain by obstructing the development of 
high-tech industries in the more backward countries and encouraging them instead 
to specialize in supplying them with raw materials and intermediate goods. East 
Berlin’s championing of internationalization in fact expressed ‘national egotism.’ 
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For, thanks to its ‘advanced technological capacity within the eastern bloc,’ as 
Raymond Stokes has put it (2000: 134), ‘the country stood to gain from agreements to 
specialize, since it was likely to benefit from export of high-value-added machinery 
and equipment to its socialist neighbors.’ Given the stark economic divisions and 
political power differentials within the Comecon region, a relatively equitable 
integration of Comecon along the lines experienced in Western Europe was never a 
realistic proposition.
Intra-élite Tensions
As national autarky and the Soviet-bloc cohesion began to give way to an orientation 
to external markets, ideas of a socialist market economy and political pluralism gained 
ground throughout the region. Unlike Hungary, East Germany did not experience 
open intra-élite divisions. But it did experience the same underlying problems. For 
the economy of the GDR, as for Hungary and Poland, the 1980s was a lost decade, 
marked by decreasing competitiveness and an unsustainable debt burden. In East 
Berlin, as in Warsaw and Budapest, élites were torn between commitments to existing 
structures of accumulation, ideologies, and international alliances, and an imperative 
to economic restructuring and revitalized engagement with Western businesses and 
states. Increasingly, competition with the West was augmented by cooperation. 
Autarky was abandoned. Détente, and expanding trade relations, encouraged a 
proliferation of collaborative ventures and associated political negotiations that 
helped to modify perceptions of the West.
Over the course of the 1980s, acute tensions developed over international 
economic policy. Some sections of the élite banked on furthering détente and 
cooperation with Western firms and states. This strategy, they were well aware, was 
potentially dangerous. In the archives of the old regime one finds repeated warnings 
that that Bonn’s support for economic cooperation ‘is a plank in the FRG’s strategy 
of achieving reunification’. Such fears, however, were taken much more seriously 
by the opposed group, for whom the emphasis was ‘communist internationalism’, 
understood as reaffirming East Germany’s orientation to Comecon and the Warsaw 
Pact. They too perceived the need to pursue economic integration, but held that this 
should occur above all within Comecon.
In the late 1980s these divisions were exacerbated by renewed economic 
difficulties that demanded urgent action. With East Germany’s balance of trade 
declining precipitously, new policies were sought. Some functionaries advocated 
expediting direct cooperation with Western businesses. Without support from West 
Germany, the head of economic planning Gerhard Schürer warned, the GDR would 
‘be unable to find anyone else to take twenty billion dollars of debts off our hands’ 
(Schürer 1992: 142). Others were aghast at the dependency upon Bonn to which 
this path would lead: it would turn the GDR into an ‘object of exploitation’ for West 
German business.
A second economic policy debate turned on reductions in state expenditure. With 
powerful claims – from workers, enterprise managers, and from international banks 
for debt servicing – for diminishing revenues, SED leaders looked to slash spending. 
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In 1988, Schürer proposed that consumer goods subsidies, the microelectronics 
industry and the security forces were suitable candidates for cuts. However, 
powerful constituencies backed the status quo in each of these areas, and Schürer’s 
suggestions were for the most part rejected (Roesler 1993: 569). Later the same 
year the politburo did agree to reduce the budget for consumer subsidies and for the 
security services. Although a relatively moderate measure it nonetheless led, for the 
first time in the Honecker era, to open resistance from government ministers, seven 
of whom refused to accept the decision (Hertle 1996: 72).
Tensions over economic policy were overlaid by the challenge posed by ‘new 
thinking’ in the USSR. Moscow’s reforms undermined the confidence of official 
East Germany. For many, Gorbachev came to symbolize an untrustworthy ally and 
a worrying decline in Soviet power, while for others he represented resolution and 
initiative, qualities that the domestic leadership blatantly lacked. Throughout the 
apparatuses of power there was considerable sympathy for glasnost and perestroika. 
Interviews with SED functionaries and Stasi officers reveal that criticisms of the 
leadership were widely held, if rarely articulated.4
Neither the defenders of orthodoxy nor the reformers possessed clear ideas 
as to how to extricate the country from economic decline. From the mid-1980s, 
politburo member Siegfried Lorenz recalls (Schütt 1992: 148–154), ‘there was no 
doubt that fundamental changes and reforms were necessary in the GDR. There was 
much discussion about this … . And yet at the end of the day we just kept our 
mouths shut. Ultimately, we had no plausible and comprehensive alternative.’ This 
was no cohesive, ideologically-fired élite. On the contrary, policymakers were losing 
faith. By the late 1980s a survey of security élites revealed that only about half 
found Marxist-Leninist ideology credible (Thompson 2004: 76). Behind the façade 
of unity, profound policy disagreements existed, divisions that were to manifest 
themselves in 1989.
‘The Edifice of Rule Starts to Crumble’
The series of sensational reforms in Hungary and Poland in early 1989 were 
described by an incensed Erich Honecker as ‘the visibly accelerating erosion of 
socialist power, achievements, and values’ (Hertle 1996: 92). The SED leadership 
behaved as if stunned. Outwardly, East Berlin maintained a stiff silence, punctuated 
by declamations of the unity of the socialist bloc. Those in charge held faster to 
the certainties that had underpinned their survival thus far. The crisis intensified 
in the summer, with the westward emigration of East German citizens. Hemmed in 
by Soviet ambivalence, Hungarian ‘treachery’, and by the GDR’s reliance upon 
international banks and upon Bonn, the SED leadership was ill equipped to respond. 
Diplomatic representations to Budapest were fruitless, revealing the East Berlin 
regime’s impotence to the populace and the world.
As morale declined amongst the SED’s supporters, citizens began to organize. In 
the first months of 1989 a rash of small protests attested to rising confidence of the 
4  Interviews with Michael Brie, Helmut Meier, Rolf Richter, Berlin, 1994.
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‘grassroots’ opposition groups. By late August at least 17 initiatives existed which 
aspired to establish an independent oppositional presence. Of these, New Forum 
made the greatest impact. Within fourteen days of its formation some five thousand 
had signed its list of supporters.
The uprising itself began in Leipzig, when street demonstrations of would-be 
emigrants were joined by ‘here-stayers’ calling for reform. The regime was determined 
to crush the movement but buckled. A number of factors explain its failure, including 
the number and determination of demonstrators and Moscow’s refusal to commit 
troops, but also divisions within the SED leadership and the willingness of senior 
police officers and middle-level officials to negotiate with protestors. The continued 
growth of demonstrations revealed the exhaustion of a strategy based upon police 
methods and weakened its authors, notably Honecker himself. With Gorbachev’s 
tacit approval, members of the Central Committee and Politburo plotted his removal, 
which they secured in mid October.
The new SED leader, Egon Krenz was a cautious and conservative figure, and 
his administration could hardly be described as reformist. However, in his inaugural 
speech he did promise that the regime ‘will introduce a Wende [turnaround], with 
immediate effect’. The Wende involved the renunciation of armed force in favour 
of conspiratorial techniques of counter-subversion, coupled with some immediate 
concessions and promises of significant reform. These measures, it was hoped, would 
boost the new government’s credibility, and enable the demonstration movement 
to be contained. Whereas repression had provoked protest, SED leaders believed, 
concessions would appease it. They assumed that several months breathing space 
would be gained in which to retrench and restructure. The Wende was designed as 
a holding operation, providing a framework within which the nomenklatura could 
begin to restructure itself in an orderly fashion. But these hopes were to prove illusory. 
The Wende reforms failed to dampen the popular movement. To the contrary, the 
numbers filling the streets and squares climbed exponentially.
In this potted summary of the early stages of the revolution, some divergence from 
the assessments outlined in the first section of this article may be seen. The GDR was 
not as autarkic as Batt maintains. Regime unity was more fragile, and the opposition 
more organized, than Friedheim suggests. But these differences are of emphasis only. 
They modify rather than challenge the image of a unified, intransigent ruling élite, 
poorly equipped to adapt to changing circumstances, unprepared for negotiation, and 
facing an unfolding crisis in which the drive for change came from below.
As regards subsequent events, however, my interpretation deviates substantially 
from those of Batt, Friedheim and Fulbrook too. In the following, it will be argued 
that East Germany in 1989 does not readily fit into the ‘rupture / collapse’ model 
of transition. The opposition movement of the late 1980’s in East Germany was 
somewhat stronger, and the SED more divided, than commonly supposed. SED 
leaders proved capable of learning, and they did instigate radical reforms. Reformist 
leaders such as Hans Modrow embraced parliamentary democracy under duress, but 
their revised attitudes to democracy and the market were not simply a product of 
adaptation to changing circumstances. The ground had been prepared in the 1980s, 
with the erosion of élite beliefs in ‘Marxist-Leninism’. Although negotiation was not 
as central to the transition process as in Poland or Hungary, pact making involving 
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regime and opposition did occur, at the Round Table. In the same period (winter 
1989-90), the established ‘bloc’ parties disengaged from the SED, helping to create 
a pluralist political landscape, before merging with their West German counterparts. 
Power was not surrendered to protestors on to the streets, but was passed to reformists, 
most of whom had occupied senior positions in the old regime. By and large, the East 
German élite did not lose the ‘will to rule’. As elsewhere in Central and Eastern 
Europe, existing élites by and large adapted to new circumstances. Economic 
leaders (such as Kombinat General Directors) repositioned themselves, hoping 
to emerge from the transition as managers or even owners of private companies; 
police chiefs, army officers and state officials strove to remain at their posts; even 
SED functionaries hoped to remain influential players, in a competitive party field 
alongside their erstwhile allies of the ‘bloc parties’ and citizens’ movement groups. 
Although German unification, and the determination of West Germany’s rulers to 
impose its structures on the East, ensured that East Germany did not experience what 
Adam Michnik (in Nagle and Mahr 1999: 202-3) has called the ‘velvet restoration’ 
of old élites that was experienced elsewhere in Eastern Europe, in the first year 
following the uprising these hopes were realized to a significant degree. Not only 
was the Modrow administration committed to minimising élite replacement, so too 
was its CDU-led successor. It is therefore one-sided to describe the end of the SED 
regime under the rubric ‘collapse’. Rather, it wound down its affairs and restructured 
– and it was assisted in this, albeit with reluctance, by the citizens’ movement. As 
a transition to democracy, this was closer to the ‘extrication’ model than to that of 
‘collapse’.
Polish Lessons
Faced by mounting popular pressure, most of the East German élite chose not to 
raise the white flag but to adapt to the changing circumstances. They showed an 
ability to learn, notably that certain strategies, notably Honecker’s attempt to clamp 
down on dissent and the Wende project of appeasing protest with sops, were futile 
or counter-productive. They were also keen to learn from the experiences of their 
counterparts elsewhere. After Honecker’s downfall, Poland entered the frame as a 
‘reference state’ – defined by Nancy Bermeo (1992: 28) as a polity that, by virtue 
of ‘geographic proximity, cultural similarity, shared history, or some combination 
of the three’, serves as a point of comparison for policymakers elsewhere. From 
the vantage point of the Polish Communist party (PZPR), it was engaged not in 
a project of maintaining existing institutions but of restructuring such that core 
goals could be advanced and élite replacement minimized. In general terms, the 
aim was to restructure élite organization from a centralized nomenklatura model to 
a Western-style formation. The dismantling of the nomenklatura system had begun 
with a Round Table agreement that had originally been envisaged ‘as initiating a 
four-year transition period towards full democracy, pluralism and marketization 
under conditions of general, if loose, Communist domination during which the 
PZPR would learn how to maintain its rule through competitive methods’ (Sanford 
1997: 178). The Communists’ plans began to unravel when the PZPR was trounced 
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in national elections in June 1989. However, while the new government was headed 
by a Solidarność advisor, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Communists retained control of 
the Interior and Defence ministries and the government operated through existing 
Communist institutions, as modified by the Round Table.
It was at this juncture that Egon Krenz journeyed to Warsaw to seek advice from 
his Polish comrades. One of these, General Jaruzelski, reassured his guest that he 
didn’t find liberal democracy to be the evil that they had once assumed, and that 
democratic reform did not threaten the nomenklatura’s core commitments to capital 
accumulation, social control and political stability. Just as, in the USSR, glasnost 
was vital to winning allies to the cause of perestroika, so, in Poland, democracy 
could prove an indispensable means of selling austerity to a sceptical public. Nor 
did democratization equate to capitulation. ‘We have, of course, transferred the 
enterprise’, the General continued, drawing a telling analogy between the Communist 
élite and company directors, ‘but have secured for ourselves a controlling stake, 
in the shape of participation in the government, security forces and army, and the 
office of president.’ Of greater significance than these tools of control, however, was 
the degree to which old regime and opposition élites could find common ground. 
‘In respect of cooperation within the coalition, it is the shared position with regard 
to the interests of state that is central. Here, I find myself on the same terrain as 
Prime Minister Masowiecki’ (Krenz 1999: 207). In Poland at the time, nomenklatura 
privatization was already well under way, and although Jaruzelski did not yet know 
it, was destined to be successful for much of the old élite. Entrenched antagonism 
between Communist Party and opposition began to give way to a fragmented system, 
in which Solidarność factions in the Sejm were later to make common cause with 
the Communist successor party (Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland) on a 
variety of issues, including electoral law.
Krenz did not return from Poland fully convinced of the need to follow Jaruzelski’s 
advice. Yet he could not ignore the parallels. Like Poland in the 1980s, his country 
was in the throes of economic crisis, a major reform initiative (the Wende) had failed 
to restore regime legitimacy, and the prime obstacle to future, SED-led, reform was 
dwindling public trust. If Krenz’s ostensibly reformist administration was to retain 
any credibility, major concessions would be inescapable. As in Poland, the only 
viable course seemed to be democratization, and nomenklatura privatization.
By early November, the more far-sighted SED leaders were becoming 
convinced that, whatever the end goal, the impending transition could not but 
involve a conciliatory approach to the citizens’ movement organizations. The 
Central Committee was advised by Lorenz that, ‘a situation has arisen whereby 
we must approach certain representatives of ‘New Forum’ in a constructive way, 
particularly those who seek to prevent chaos – those who show clearly, and in public, 
a willingness to exert a calming influence’ (Hertle 1997: 199). At the same gathering, 
another Party notable also declared that negotiations with the citizens’ movement 
would be necessary, and sweetened the pill for sceptical sections of the audience 
with the counter-intuitive argument that this would in fact provide the best means of 
‘demonstrating, in practice, our power and our leading position’ (Hertle 1997: 336).
In the same period, major reforms were announced, measures that would 
inexorably undermine the SED’s power monopoly, including greater independence 
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for the ‘bloc parties’, the media, and parliament, the dissociation of Party and State, 
and permission for citizens to travel freely to the ‘non-socialist abroad’. In brief, 
the fall of the Wall was not quite such a sharp watershed as some historians have 
suggested, for far-reaching reforms had been initiated already in preceding weeks; 
indeed, such reforms – of travel rights – precipitated that event.
‘We Are Not Deserters!’
The breaching of the Wall was unquestionably a demoralising experience for its 
guardians. In the aftermath, the regime was subjected to a lengthy period of intense 
and unremitting pressure from the street movement, and from its own base, and 
began to disintegrate. ‘Pressure is bearing upon us from all sides’, Egon Krenz 
confided to his diary, ‘Pressure from “below” and pressure from “without”: The 
street demonstrations, the demoralization of the Party, the break-up of the socialist 
fraternity, the rise of anti-socialist forces, the anti-GDR policies of Bonn, all this 
influences the situation’ (Krenz 1999: 05). The exigency of stemming legitimacy 
decline led to an accelerated turnover of personnel in the apparatuses of power. The 
collective resignations of Politburo and government, already on November 7, were 
followed by that of the Stasi leadership. The SED continued to haemorrhage, losing 
hundreds of thousands of members in a matter of weeks. In the security forces the 
picture was likewise one of disintegration. Police officers joined street demonstrations. 
In the army, officers were presented by soldiers with the alternative of acceding to 
demands for reform or facing mass desertions. Even the Stasi was not immune to 
tendencies of decay.
These manifestations of disintegration eroded the effectiveness of the apparatuses 
of power and generated an atmosphere of impending collapse – one which thickened 
when old-regime institutions accelerated the destruction of files. But these institutions 
did not in fact ‘dissolve’, and neither did the ‘will to rule’. The breaching of the 
Wall demoralized the élite, yet its commitment to retaining control of the transition 
process remained intact. Initially, it was hoped that new travel freedoms and 
personnel turnover would deflate the protest movement, rewarding the regime with 
a breathing space in which to broaden its power base and restructure. Although less 
taut and increasingly frayed, the reins of power remained in the hands of the SED 
leadership, passing via Krenz to Hans Modrow. It was widely believed in SED circles 
that, if further reforms were made and the citizens’ movement courted, the march route 
could be pulled back onto the tracks of ‘passive revolution’ (or ‘transition through 
extrication’), characterized by limited popular involvement and gradual institutional 
and personnel change.
In this, SED leaders were encouraged by auspicious signals from Moscow. In 
November, Foreign Minister Edward Sheverdnadse indicated that the USSR would 
continue to guarantee East Germany’s sovereignty. Gorbachev, when addressing 
East European leaders at the Kremlin in early December, conceded that their task 
was a difficult one but enjoined them to retain command: ‘We‘re no longer in a 
situation of finding solutions; rather, the task is simply to control the wagon and keep 
a grip of the reins‘ (Krenz 1999: 348). For the most part, East German functionaries 
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identified with this spirit; they came to redefine their role, in the words of one SED 
leader, as guardians of ‘an orderly transition to a new society’ (Zimmermann and 
Schütt 1992: 229).
The reforms implemented by Hans Modrow’s new government in the month that 
followed the Wall’s fall transformed the polity, and to the extent that they were entered 
upon hastily, as a last-ditch response to the ongoing exodus and protests, metaphors 
of discontinuity (such as ‘collapse’) are warranted. Yet elements of continuity were 
present in equal measure. The regime resembled a vessel which, although badly holed 
and possibly sinking, remained afloat and largely responsive to the actions of the crew, 
most of whom remained at their stations. One should resist the temptation of allowing 
the noisy splashes of change, as captain and first mate were thrown overboard, to drown 
out the underlying hum of continuity. Modrow himself was undoubtedly committed 
to reform but his face was hardly new. His government was dominated by the SED, 
and although only a third of its ministers had served in the previous administration 
the remainder were promoted from within the middle and upper ranks of old-regime 
institutions.
The new government instigated a radical reform course. The apex of power shifted 
from SED General Secretary to Prime Minister, and the Council of Ministers was freed 
from its subordination to the Politburo. Significant steps were taken towards more 
transparent and democratic governance. The political process was democratized, 
as symbolized by the appointment of a commission to investigate functionaries’ 
privileges and corruption, and by the Attorney General’s initiation of proceedings 
against members of the security forces accused of abuses against demonstrators. The 
SED retreated from its role as ligature of the arteries of power and adopted instead 
the structure of a western-style political party. On December 1 its ‘lead role’ was 
struck from the constitution and the National Front was dismantled, formalising the 
independent status of the formerly SED-loyal ‘bloc parties’- Christian Democrat Union 
(CDU), National Democratic Party (NDPD), and LDPD. In the economic sphere, too, 
far-reaching change was in the air. Already before the fall of the Wall SED leaders 
had propounded radical economic reform, and thereafter the only serious debates 
(if the question of German unification is set aside) concerned the tempo of change 
and whether some loosely defined Third Way of ‘market socialism’, as propounded 
by the SED, or privatized market capitalism, should be the goal. Private property 
rights were expanded. Prices were oriented to world market levels, and cooperation 
between Kombinate and western firms was expedited.
Seeing that the wind was turning, thousands of loyal supporters of the old regime 
began to abandon Communism, command economy, Moscow and all, to become 
more or less devout supporters of market capitalism. The embrace of economic 
and political liberalization affected all sectors of the élite but was most pronounced 
amongst senior members of the bloc parties, individuals who had been faithful 
servants of the old order and had benefited from the sinecures that such positions 
brought but who could more readily divest themselves from associations with 
Communism. A representative example was CDU leader Lothar de Maizière who, 
in November, was able to describe socialism as ‘one of humanity’s most beautiful 
visions’ yet, only months later, presided over his party’s election campaign that 
treated the socialist values of rival parties, including the SPD, with vitriol (Teltschik 
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1991: 38). The ease with which so many functionaries appeared to discover that 
socialism had been flawed all along and that market capitalism and parliamentary 
democracy represented a desirable alternative was striking, and a popular epithet 
was coined to describe the spectacle. ‘Wrynecks’ they were called, after the bird that 
can effortlessly swivel its head 180 degrees.’5
General Strike or Round Table
Simultaneously with the restructuring of institutions and economy, the new 
administration under Modrow also stepped up its engagement with the citizens’ 
movement. Against a background of radicalizing protests, enlisting the aid of 
moderates seemed the only way of restoring stability and helping the regime to 
regain a modicum of credibility.
It is commonly supposed that, as bargaining power shifted from the SED to 
opposition forces, political initiative and actual power automatically followed (see 
for example Welsh 1994: 394-7). However, it would be more accurate to say that, 
as their bargaining power lessened, the old regime parties managed, with more 
than a little success, to maintain the initiative, and political power. Consider, by 
way of introduction to this argument, a strategy discussion involving Modrow and 
Wolfgang Schwanitz, at a meeting held at the latter’s inauguration as chief of the 
secret police.6 ‘The GDR’s situation is considerably more serious and much more 
difficult and complicated than it appears from outside,’ Modrow lamented, referring 
to the economic crisis and the unceasing exodus. As to the protest movement, no 
amount of concessions seemed able to placate it. Schwanitz also warned of the 
danger of instability. ‘Time is pressing, like a hand on our throats’ he said, ‘we must 
get this pressure off us. … our power is at stake, we should have no illusions about 
that.’ The two agreed that the top priority was to win back public trust. ‘The game 
that we should play’ with the ‘friendlier’ sections of the movement (the citizens’ 
movement organizations), Modrow proposed, is to draw them into cooperation with 
established institutions; Offer them a morsel of power, above all, at local-level ‘round 
tables’. Then, when their representatives are shouldering a portion of responsibility 
and carrying the can for unpopular decisions, their allegiance to the state will be 
cemented even while the key centres of authority remain untouched.
Modrow and Schwanitz’s intentions were clear, but their realization depended 
upon an unknown factor: the reaction of the citizens’ movement. On the very day of 
Schwanitz’s inauguration, the outlines of its response began to take shape, in the form 
of an appeal by Democracy Now for ‘democratic parties’ to begin negotiations at a 
national ‘Round Table’. Hardly had the appeal been announced than it was taken up 
positively by parties of the old regime. For them, Dieter Rucht has written, ‘the Table 
was an unwillingly accepted but necessary means to retain power by a strategy of co-
optation’ (Rucht 1996: 41). It helped them to regain the initiative at a time when the 
citizens’ movement was still finding its bearings following the fall of the Wall.
5  The German word, Wendehals, puns on ‘Wende’.
6  The full document is archived in BStU, ZA (ZAIG 4886).
017 Stiv Ch 12.indd   212 02/10/2007   16:46:12
Modelling Democratic Transition in Southern and Central Europe 213
The emerging rapprochement between regime and citizens’ movement was put 
to the test in early December, a turbulent period marked by protest radicalization. 
Prisons erupted in revolt, with inmates demanding an amnesty, reform of the 
criminal code, improved conditions, and participation in prison decision-making. 
The movement began to enter the workplaces too. In the South, a wave of industrial 
action occurred, affecting a hundred workplaces and tens of thousands of workers. It 
crested on December 6, with a general strike call from Karl-Marx-Stadt New Forum, 
and strikes in several towns, including a general strike in Plauen.
For New Forum, this was the first of two defining moments. Its leadership was 
aware that the opportunity existed for the SED regime to be swept from office. ‘Power 
to New Forum!’ was a popular slogan on demonstrations. Delegations from several 
major factories approached New Forum bearing the message ‘We’re prepared to 
strike; just give us the signal.’7 On the other hand, New Forum had already committed 
itself to inter-élite negotiation at the Round Table, and this depended upon a spirit of 
compromise with the regime that would be negated by support for mass action. Its 
leaders had to decide which way to jump: Round Table or general strike, negotiation 
or ‘ruptura’. After a somewhat confused debate they opted for the former, and took 
their seats at the Table, the declared aim of which was to seek ways ‘to overcome the 
crisis’ (Lohmar 1995: 66).
The second defining moment occurred a month later. In the intervening period 
the regime had retrenched. In late December the promised disbanding of the 
secret police had been postponed until the following summer. At the Round Table, 
government representatives prevaricated, particularly with regard to dissolving the 
Stasi. In this context, and against a backdrop of economic breakdown and mass 
emigration, opposition leaders demanded that the government resume progress on 
Stasi reform. If not, they warned, up to a million workers in the South were prepared 
to take political strike action. Indeed, a strike wave was already underway, across 
the country, with a variety of economic and political aims, including expedited 
democratization and Stasi dissolution.
Yet again, citizens’ movement leaders faced a dilemma. The opportunity to push 
for rapid democratization was apparent. Yet, as in December, the fear that continued 
popular action would lead to chaos weighed heavy. Regime spokespeople such as 
SED-PDS leader Gregor Gysi appealed to these fears, urging movement leaders 
to ‘join with the SED-PDS in appealing for calm’ (Neues Deutschland, 18 January 
1990). As in early December, the movement was at a crossroads. ‘Had the civic 
movement been prepared to more fully exploit the situation’, Steven Pfaff (1999: 
425) observes, ‘it is likely that the Modrow government could have been compelled 
to take much more radical steps or have collapsed completely. Of course, this is 
precisely what the civic movements feared – a popular upsurge they could not fully 
control.’
What did result from this, the popular movement’s final upsurge, was a strategic 
shift on the part of government. From mid-January onwards it became markedly more 
cooperative towards the opposition. At the Round Table, the SED collaborated with 
the new forces on drafting a constitution for a democratic GDR and, in February, 
7  New Forum spokesperson Klaus Wolfram, interviewed in Berlin, January 1995.
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opposition members were invited into a Government of National Responsibility. 
However, the more significant phenomenon of the time was not the co-optation of 
new forces but cooperation between the established parties of Germanies East and 
West. In February, the West German CDU formed an alliance with its namesake in 
the East – alongside a small citizens’ movement group, Democratic Awakening and, 
later on, another bloc party, the German Farmers Party (DBD) – while the western 
Free Democrats (FDP) hitched up with the two remaining bloc parties, the LDPD and 
the National Democratic Party (NDPD). Following elections in March, these parties, 
alongside the SPD, formed the GDR’s final government, a caretaker administration 
that ruled until October when the GDR ceased to exist. Although some ministries were 
occupied by former oppositionists, this was no government of ‘new forces’. Rather, 
it was dominated by former functionaries from the middle and upper layers of the 
bloc parties, typified by the new premier, Lothar de Maizière, who had been a senior 
figure in the (eastern) CDU since 1987. ‘All the three major players with whom Kohl 
formed the Alliance for Germany,’ Dirk Philipsen has pointed out, ‘namely the General 
Secretary of the CDU, Martin Kirchner, the chairman of the CDU and later Prime 
Minister, Lothar de Maizière, and the chairman of Democratic Awakening, Wolfgang 
Schnur, had for many years served as Stasi informants’ (Philipsen 1993: 337). Both 
Kohl himself and his government, Philipsen adds, ‘possessed conclusive evidence of 
this fact at the time.’
Nomenklatura Privatization
The story of Eastern Europe’s transition is one of a learning process, in which 
functionaries came to see that although democratization would spell the collapse 
of the nomenklatura system, it need not spell the demise of their class’s power. 
Communism itself was dispensable; and functionaries generally paid obeisance to 
Marxism not as a guide to, but as sanctification of, their Party’s practice. For company 
managers, state officials and a range of other élite groups, their allegiance to the 
Party was a particular form of organising their loyalty to, and identification with, 
the national ruling class. Industrialists, Chris Harman points out (1990), did not care 
too much about ideology, providing they could run their enterprises successfully, 
accumulating capital to protect their very substantial privileges. They would hold 
party cards because party membership helped them to succeed – and because the 
party helped stamp out dissent among the workforce. But they did not take the 
party’s avowed beliefs seriously.
This style of ‘pragmatic’ Communism was also pervasive in the state apparatuses, 
and even amongst Party cadre. Soviet-type institutions were given support in so far as 
they provided a viable framework for the achievement of economic growth and social 
control, but could be discarded without undue fuss when these conditions no longer 
obtained. This accounts for the ‘Wryneck’ phenomenon – the easy abandonment by 
Eastern European élites of what had appeared to be deeply held beliefs.
As Harman has argued (1990: 66), in a comparison between the transitions in 
Eastern Europe and regime changes of earlier times, a ruling party and a ruling 
class are never quite the same thing. The former represents the latter, binding its 
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members together in a common discipline which helps them achieve their common 
goals against the rest of society. But the class can preserve the real source of its 
power and privileges, its control over the means of production, even when the party 
falls apart. This was shown in Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain after the fall of 
their fascisms.
In the post-fascist cases, the unitary party that bound industrialists, landowners, 
police chiefs, army officers and government ministers into a tight network 
disintegrated, but, a measure of élite replacement and reforms to corporate ownership 
notwithstanding, was replaced in each instance by a pluralist political system that 
preserved the class divisions upon which capitalist order rests. In Eastern Europe, 
changes to ownership structures were greater, but here too, ‘the enterprise heads, 
the ministry officials, the generals, even most of the police chiefs, remain[ed] in 
place’. They did not abdicate but sought positions in new or reformed institutions, 
establishing new political parties and creating new structures of accumulation.
Harman’s study, published in 1990, was prescient. As the years have passed, 
evidence has accumulated that shows high rates of élite continuity in Eastern Europe. 
In 1996, a concise summary was published by John Higley, Judith Kullberg and Jan 
Pakulski. During and after the transitions of 1989-91, they conclude (1996: 137), 
communist leaders scrambled to protect their power bases or to create new ones. Their 
maneuvers were varied. Some negotiated places for themselves in postcommunist 
regimes through the famous “roundtable talks.” Many cashed in the credits they had 
accumulated through patron-client networks and appropriated large parts of state-
industrial enterprises (“nomenklatura privatization”); still others colluded in “mafia” 
activities to profit from weakened state oversight and regulation. 
Democracy, they added, did not constitute a major threat to established élites in 
the region: Instead of having to fight tooth and nail to defend their power and status, 
most élites associated with the old order have adapted to democratization without 
major loss. … nothing approaching a “revolutionary” circulation of élites occurred; 
in this key respect there were no Central and East European revolutions in 1989-
91.
In a monograph published the same year, Klaus von Beyme made the case that in 
contrast to democratic transitions from right-wing authoritarian dictatorships, ‘[t]here 
was no fundamental turnover of élites’ in Eastern Europe’ (von Beyme 1996: 67-8). 
In no former wave of democratization, he continues, ‘were the reformed forces of 
the old regime able to make a come-back so quickly as in Eastern Europe’. Perhaps 
the most notorious case is Russia, where the private sector is dominated by former 
Soviet monopolies seized by ex-Communist officials who have become the core of 
a semi-criminalized business class. This ‘new’ capitalist class is so extraordinarily 
intertwined with the state that Russia’s post-transition economic system is described 
by the Financial Times as ‘a corporate state, … a new form of state capitalism’ and 
by one prominent liberal politician, Grigory Yavlinsky, as ‘a 100 per cent merger 
between business and the authorities’ (Cohen 2000: 142).
In East Germany, the alchemy that saw a portion of the ‘old’ bureaucratic power 
transmuted into investments in the embryonic new Germany was an important aspect 
of the transition period. The process began towards the end of 1989 and continued 
apace in 1990 under the coalition government of Lothar de Maizière. Under Modrow, 
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the liberalization of land and property markets enabled thousands of functionaries 
to exploit the resultant opportunities, buying up land and scooping luxury properties 
at bargain basement prices. Those in positions of economic authority, and with 
appropriate connections and knowledge, were able to siphon ‘people’s own’ funds 
into their newly-established firms or bank accounts, transferring large sums with a 
few strokes of the pen. Loopholes in the State Treaty (which unified the currencies of 
the two Germanies) enabled functionaries to convert colossal sums of GDR Marks 
and ‘transfer roubles’ into Deutschmarks at parity, by illicit methods. In such ways, 
Martin Flug has described (1992: 26), thousands of members of the old regime, 
including the ‘dissolved’ Stasi, became German unification’s victors, through the 
back door.’
As the ‘communist’ élites filed across their hastily constructed bridge to capitalist 
democracy, two striking phenomenas could be observed. One was the readiness with 
which most of them shed the ideological commitments and trappings of their previous 
calling. Senior army officers, to give an example that stands for many, happily 
exchanged the title ‘Genosse’ [comrade] for ‘Herr.’ Managers resigned their SED 
membership in droves, and actively sought partnership with the western ‘enemy’. 
The second phenomenon of note was that although, unlike elsewhere in Eastern 
Europe, the transition necessitated the sacrifice of many of those most implicated 
with the old regime, this process took place much more gradually than is usually 
thought. In mid-1991, élite replacement had been minimal. In the economy, 70–80 
per cent of directors and managers of the Kombinate had been managers before 
1989. In politics, it was largely middle and lower officials who were able to remain 
active; hundreds of the bloc parties’ elected representatives in the new Germany 
had been activists or functionaries in the old GDR. In the army, the vast majority of 
senior officers were retained, albeit at one rank beneath their existing station. As to 
the administrative élite, some took the opportunity of early retirement while others 
engineered their transfer to offices with greater prospects. In the legal élite, 78 of 
1,300 judges were forced to resign by June 1990, but the remainder were allowed to 
‘cleanse’ their files of incriminating documents pending re-election.
In the long run, of course, German unification led to far greater élite replacement 
in the former GDR than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Indeed, for this very reason 
the threat of unification had haunted SED leaders throughout the transition 
period. For them, it sharply exacerbated the dilemmas of liberalization. When, for 
example, Krenz had listened to General Jaruzelski’s cheerful descriptions of the 
‘shared position with regard to the interests of state’ between Communist Party and 
Solidarność leaders, the East German leader had found little comfort. The question 
‘But what are the interests of state?’ nagged at him. It highlighted the distinction 
between his precarious situation and the General’s. ‘However great the extent of 
reforms in Poland, the state remains Poland’, he wrote in his diary (Krenz 1999: 
207); ‘But what if the SED loses? Without it the GDR would not exist. … There 
would be no raison d‘être for two capitalist German states. The GDR‘s existence as 
a German state depends upon its socialist nature.’
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Epilogue: German Unification and the European Union
Although the focus of this chapter has been upon domestic developments within the 
GDR, the end of the Cold War and German unification were to have far-reaching 
effects on the European Union. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the threat that had helped to bring the EU’s 
founder members together was, at a stroke, removed. This posed, more starkly than 
ever, the question of a common European security system. It raised the possibility 
of the eastwards expansion of the EU, and it altered the elaborate internal balance of 
relations between the EU’s larger member states.
To begin with the last of these, the EU had originally developed around a strong 
and equal France-Germany partnership, with France exercising a political and military 
lead, and Germany economically dominant. Two other similar sized states, Britain, 
Italy, provided the other legs of the main table, so to speak. With German unification, 
one of those four ‘legs’ suddenly became far larger, by population, territory and, 
albeit to a lesser extent, GDP. Germany was now fully sovereign, and its geostrategic 
situation changed too: from its previous frontline position, it now came to occupy 
a pivotal position with European trading networks, and became the largest trading 
partner with all Central European states. This marked a major expansion of influence 
for the FRG, one that for long had perforce been advanced only subtly, through 
Ostpolitik. Moreover, whereas in the 1980’s two of the three EU accession states had 
been culturally and geographically close to France, in the 1990s the enlargement zone 
was in more German-influenced regions. 
In the early 1990s, Germany’s stabilising role with the EU seemed to vanish, and 
in some respects it became a disruptive factor. Economically, Germany experienced 
a unification-induced boom which, due to the enormous transfer expenses involved, 
caused interest rates to soar. Due to the Deutschmark’s centrality in the European 
Monetary System the rest of the European Union was forced to raise interest 
rates, even though economic conditions were unlike those obtaining in Germany. 
The upshot was a series of foreign exchange crises, culminating in the expulsion 
of Britain and Italy from the European Exchange-rate Mechanism. Ideologically, 
Germany experienced a period of heightened nationalism. Its foreign policy stance, 
in addition, grew more assertive, with minesweepers and troops despatched to the 
Persian Gulf, Iran, Cambodia, and Somalia, and the Luftwaffe to Serbia. United 
Germany was no longer so willing to defer to French political leadership; it now 
sought a political role commensurate with its economic strength.
Superficially, these developments seemed at the time to presage a new German 
arrogance, one that could spell long-term difficulties for the European Union. In fact, 
Bonn was careful to embed its new assertiveness within a renewed commitment to 
the EU. In the years in which unification was being implemented, a period of rising 
nationalism, fascist movements, and a widespread uncertainty as to Germany’s new 
role and intentions, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was ever keen to insist that his goal of 
rapid unification would occur in tandem with a firmer embedding of Germany within 
the EU. France, and other member states, grasped the opportunity, and pressed for 
further political integration – notably by expediting a common security and foreign 
policy – and further economic integration, in the form of currency union.
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